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us all of the material and moral forces of a nation at bay and of a political system on trial for its life—the technical accomplishment of the soldier, the hasty exploitation of limited raw materials by the chemist and the physicist, the drab misery of the working classes, the patient, unrewarded labor of women. The resultant impression is that of intense popular energy, still concentrated and co-ordinated under the old leadership.

ROBERT H. FIFE, jr.

*German Social Democracy during the War.* By EDWYN BEVAN.  
(New York: E. P. Dutton and Company. 1919. Pp. x, 280.  
\$2.50.)

MR. BEVAN, writing in the spring of 1918, had access, as an Englishman, to files of German newspapers and to many significant Socialist pamphlets which at that time were denied to most American scholars by the British military censors. Consequently he was enabled to do what could not be done on this side of the water—to prepare from primary sources a history of German Social Democracy during the war. This he has done thoroughly, dispassionately, and interestingly, from the August days of 1914 to the dismissal of Michaelis in October, 1917.

The story is not surprising to anyone familiar with the general tendencies of the Social Democratic party in Germany on the eve of the Great War. or with the various schools of thought among its leading members. The German Socialists had fully prepared themselves to be duped by the Kaiser's government, and when the Great War actually broke they succumbed easily and at first unanimously. Germany must protect herself, they said, against the oncoming savage Russians; and in ignorance of the true situation in Belgium they rallied to the banners of the Hohenzollerns, the Junkers, and the bourgeoisie, proclaimed that Germany was fighting a war of pure self-defense such as was sanctioned by Socialist principles, and on August 4, 1914, voted as a unit the first war-credits demanded by Bethmann-Hollweg. Subsequently they were disillusioned, but the process was slow and halting. It took time for members to convince themselves, by a study of the diplomatic correspondence and the crafty conduct of the government, that Germany and Austria were the aggressors; it required real courage, moreover, to act upon such a conviction in the midst of the war-psychology of the whole German people and in the face of the traditional solidarity and discipline of their own party. With the exception of Liebknecht, who voted against the second war-credits in December, 1914, and Rühle, who joined Liebknecht in March, 1915, the Reichstag dissenters long confined their opposition to the party caucus; on the floor of the Reichstag they either voted with the majority or absented themselves when votes were taken. It was not until December, 1915, that other votes were actually cast against war-credits, and not until March, 1916, that Haase read a "minority

declaration" in the Reichstag. Thenceforth a split was fully evident, although the independent Social Democratic party was not formally launched until April, 1917. In the main, the new party—the Minority—was more Marxian than Lassallean or Revisionist: it embraced such "revolutionary" Socialists as Haase, Kautsky, Mehring, and Ledebour, although Eduard Bernstein, the apostle of revisionism, adhered to it, perhaps because of his lifelong admiration for England.

The Majority of German Social Democrats, as everyone knows, stuck to their pro-war policy to the end. Nationalists like David, Heine, Noske, and Kolb, imperialists like Cunow and Quessel, trade-union leaders like Legien and Bauer, stalwarts like Ebert, Scheidemann, and Richard Fischer, all became imbued with the patriotic spirit. In the supreme crisis of war they catered to popular emotions. They were followers of the government rather than leaders of a revolution. The Majority Socialists throughout the war were in a painful and difficult position, for they had, as it were, to carry on war simultaneously on three fronts. They had to attack the government as undemocratic in constitution, so far as their object was to procure internal reform, and as ambiguous on the question of peace, so far as they were anxious to bring about a peace on the definite basis of the *status quo*; at the same time they had to defend the government against foreigners, and also against the Minority at home. Against foreigners they had to argue that the German government, in appearance reactionary, was really just as democratic as the British, French, and American governments—or even much more democratic—and had done everything it could do to prove its genuine readiness for peace. Against the Minority, also, they had to insist upon the government's will for peace, in order to show that it was right for Socialists to support it in carrying on a defensive war; but in the matter of democratic reforms they spoke to the Minority as being with them equally determined to secure needed constitutional changes.

At the time when Mr. Bevan wrote, events seemed to indicate that the Minority Socialists were growing rapidly at the expense of the Majority. Figures were presented, in fact, at the congress of the old party at Würzburg in October, 1917, indicating that the number of subscribers to the party press had decreased since March, 1914, by one-half, and that the enrolled members had declined in number from one million to 243,000. If Mr. Bevan brings out a second volume, tracing the history of German Socialism from October, 1917, to the present, he will then have the opportunity to show how the treaty of Brest-Litovsk aided the Majority; how the alliance between the Independents and the Liebknecht extremists, or Spartacans, injured the Minority; and how the Majority, thoroughly nationalized and used to co-operation with bourgeois parties, was able to effect the revolution of November, 1918, with a minimum of violence, and to join with Centrists and Radicals in fashioning a republican constitution and creating the present government of Germany. It is greatly to be hoped that Mr. Bevan will conclude this study, for if it

should be one-half as informing and suggestive as the volume already before us, it would speedily take its place as a valuable supplement to an authoritative and really distinguished history of German Social Democracy in the Great War.

CARLTON J. H. HAYES.

*La Révolution Russe.* Par CLAUDE ANET. In four volumes. (Paris: Payot et Cie. 1918-1919. Pp. 286; 280; 243; 280. 4.50 fr. each.)

IN these four volumes the author, correspondent of the *Petit Parisien*, describes and comments on the actors and acts of the revolutionary drama as he saw it played from March, 1917, to June, 1918, the time when he left Russia. He is well fitted for the rôle of critic because of his long residence in the land of the tsars, his acquaintance with the leading men of the country, his familiarity with the Russian people and character, his understanding of socialism, his wide experience as a journalist, and his ability to judge men. Realizing the importance of the revolution he watched it carefully, gathered its documents, made notes on the conversations held with diplomats, generals, soldiers, and common people. The information thus gathered is put into good literary form and gives both the facts and the atmosphere of the revolution.

Mr. Anet does not belong to that group of men who went to Petrograd with their minds pretty well made up as to what they would see there. He was at the capital when the old régime was overthrown and, being a well-trained newspaper man, followed and recorded every move without allowing his prejudices to get the best of him. "Je regarde et j'enregistre." If he is not neutral (he is too much of a French patriot to be that), neither is he blinded by passion. He does not love the Russian Socialist, least of all the Bolsheviki, but he paints their virtues in the same strong colors as he does their vices. He has some excellent character-sketches of these men—Kerenski, Lenin, and particularly Trotski, whom he regards very highly as an organizer and as a man of action. The honors which were showered on Kerenski as well as the plaudits of the crowds filled that leader with conceit and confidence in his ability to accomplish everything by speeches. He was afraid of responsibility and acted only when a crisis forced him to do so, and then it was too late. Not so the Bolsheviki. They assumed responsibilities gladly; they knew what they wanted and how to get it. "Regardons les maximalistes. Ils ont des qualités. Ils agissent, prennent leurs responsabilités, ordonnent et savent se faire obéir." Lenin is a fanatic, a man of one idea; but "Trotski est plus souple, plus ondoyant, d'une culture plus large mais d'une orthodoxie moins sûre. On peut concevoir Trotski au service d'une autre cause. Lenine fait corps avec le socialisme intégrale." Lenin and Trotski are the two great men that the revolution has produced. Alongside of Trotski, Kerenski is "une femmelette